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Abstract
We investigate how information leakage reduces computational entropy of a random variable
X. Recall that HILL and metric computational entropy are parameterized by quality (how
distinguishable is X from a variable Z that has true entropy) and quantity (how much true
entropy is there in Z).
We prove an intuitively natural result: conditioning on an event of probability p reduces the
quality of metric entropy by a factor of p and the quantity of metric entropy by log2 1/p (note
that this means that the reduction in quantity and quality is the same, because the quantity of
entropy is measured on logarithmic scale). Our result improves previous bounds of Dziembowski
and Pietrzak (FOCS 2008), where the loss in the quantity of entropy was related to its original
quality. The use of metric entropy simplifies the analogous the result of Reingold et. al. (FOCS
2008) for HILL entropy.
Further, we simplify dealing with information leakage by investigating conditional metric
entropy. We show that, conditioned on leakage of λ bits, metric entropy gets reduced by a
factor 2λ in quality and λ in quantity. Our formulation allow us to formulate a “chain rule”
for leakage on computational entropy. We show that conditioning on λ bits of leakage reduces
conditional metric entropy by λ bits. This is the same loss as leaking from unconditional metric
entropy. This result makes it easy to measure entropy even after several rounds of information
leakage.
1
1 Introduction
Suppose you have a pseudorandom generator that, during the computation, leaks some function of
the seed to an adversary. How pseudorandom are the resulting outputs?
More generally, suppose you have a distribution that has computational entropy. Suppose some
correlated information leaks to an adversary. How much computational entropy is left?
These questions come up naturally in the context of leakage-resilient cryptography. The question
of pseudoentropy with a leaked “seed” has been addressed before primarily in two works. Dziem-
bowski and Pietrzak posed the question —about pseudorandom generators— in their construction
of a leakage-resilient stream cipher [DP08]. Reingold et. al. [RTTV08] consider the general case
of pseudoentropy of a random variable after a particular leakage in the context of computational
versions of the dense model theorem [GT08].
We consider both the leakage of a particular value and of a random variable. We provide a
simple answer to both questions (Lemma 3.5, Theorem 3.2). Theorem 3.2 is particularly elegant:
If λ bits of information are leaked, then the amount of computational entropy decreases
by at most λ.
Naturally, the answer becomes so simple only once the correct notion of entropy is in place. Our
result holds for average-case Metric∗ entropy (defined in [BSW03, DP08]). In case this notion of
entropy seems esoteric, we point out that it is convertible (with a small loss) to average-case HILL
entropy [HLR07] using the techniques of [BSW03], which can be used with randomness extractors
to get pseudorandom bits [DORS08, HLR07].
When speaking about HILL entropy and its variants, one has to keep in mind that what matters
is not only the number of bits of entropy, but also its quality. Namely, HILL entropy of a variable X
is defined as the amount of entropy in a distribution Z that is indistinguishable from X (Metric∗
entropy is defined similarly; the differences are discussed in Section 2). Indistiguishability is pa-
rameterized by the maximum size of the distinguishing circuit D and the maximum quality of its
distinguishing—i.e.,  = |E[D(X)]− E[D(Z)]|. In our results, both the amount of entropy and its
quality decrease: that is,  increases by a factor of 2λ. We note that because entropy is measured
on a logarithmic scale (min-entropy is simply the negative logarithm of maximum probability), this
loss in the quality and the quantity is actually the same.
Average-case entropy works well in situations in which not all leakage is equally informative. For
instance, in case the leakage is equal to the Hamming weight of a uniformly distributed string, some-
times the entropy of the string gets reduced to nothing (if the value of the leakage is 0 or the length
of the string), but most of the time it stays high. For the information-theoretic case, it is known
that deterministic leakage of λ bits reduces the average entropy by at most λ [DORS08, Lemma
2.2(b)] (the reduction is less for randomized leakage). Thus, our result matches the information-
theoretic case for deterministic leakage. For randomized leakage, our statement can be somewhat
improved (Theorem 3.4.3).
If a worst-case, rather than an average-case guarantee is needed, we also provide a statement
of the type “with probability at least 1− δ over all possible leakage, entropy loss due to leakage is
at most λ− log 1/δ” (Lemma 3.3). Statements of this type are used for computational entropy in
[DP08, FKPR10]. If one is interested in the entropy lost due to a specific leakage value, rather than
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over a distribution of leakage values, we provide an answer, as well (Lemma 3.5): if the leakage
has probably p, then the amount of entropy decreases by log 1/p and the quality decreases by a
factor of p (i.e.,  becomes /p). Reingold et. al. [RTTV08] provide a similar formulation for HILL
entropy. The use of metric entropy allows for a tighter reduction than [RTTV08] and allows us to
eliminate the loss in circuit size that occurs in the reduction of [RTTV08].
We also provide a chain rule: namely, our result for average-case Metric∗ entropy holds even if
the original distribution has only average-case Metric∗ entropy. Thus, in case of multiple leakages,
our result can be applied multiple times. The price for the conversion from Metric∗ to HILL entropy
needs to be paid only once. The chain rule highlights one of the advantages of average-case entropy:
if one tried to use the worst-case statement “with probability at least 1 − δ, entropy is reduced
by at most λ + log 1/δ” over several instances of leakage, then total entropy loss bound would be
greater and the probability that it is satisfied would be lower, because the δs would add up.
Our result can be used to improve the parameters of the leakage-resilient stream cipher of [DP08]
and leakage-resilient signature scheme of [FKPR10].
2 Entropy and Extraction
We begin by clarifying previous definitions of entropy and introducing a few natural definitions for
conditional entropy.
2.1 Preliminary Notation
Let x ∈ X denote an element x in the support of X. Let x ← X be the process of a sampling x
from the distribution X. Let Un represent the random variable with the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}n. Let δ(X,Y ) be the statistical distance between random variables X,Y drawn from a set
χ, defined as δ(X,Y ) = 12
∑
x∈χ |Pr(X = x) − Pr(Y = x)|. Let Ds be the set of all probabilistic
circuits of size s with binary output {0, 1}. Following the notation of [DP08], let D∗s be the set of
all deterministic circuits of size s with output in [0, 1]. We say s ≈ s′ if the two sizes s, s′ differ by
a small additive constant. Given a circuit D, define the computational distance δD between X and
Y as δD(X,Y ) = |E[D(X)]−E[D(Y )]|. We denote the size of a circuit D as |D|. For a probability
distribution X, let |X| denote the size of the support of X, that is |X| = |{x|Pr[X = x] > 0}|. All
logarithms without a base are considered base 2, that is, log x = log2 x.
2.2 Unconditional Entropy
We begin with the standard notion of min-entropy and proceed to computational notions.
Definition 1. A distribution X has min-entropy at least k, denoted H∞(X) ≥ k if
∀x ∈ X,Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−k.
Computational min-entropy has two additional parameters: distinguisher size s and quality .
Larger s and smaller  mean “better” entropy.
Definition 2. ([HILL99]) A distribution X has HILL entropy at least k, denoted HHILL,s (X) ≥ k
if there exists a distribution Y where H∞(Y ) ≥ k, such that ∀D ∈ Ds, δD(X,Y ) ≤ .
Switching the quantifiers of Y and D gives us the following, weaker notion.
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Definition 3. ([BSW03]) A distribution X hasMetric entropy at least k, denoted HMetric,s (X) ≥
k if ∀D ∈ Ds there exists a distribution Y with H∞(Y ) ≥ k and δD(X,Y ) ≤ .
Drawing D from D∗s instead of Ds in the above two definitions gives us notions of “HILL-star”
entropy HHILL
∗
,s and “metric-star” entropy H
Metric∗
,s , respectively (this notation was introduced in
[DP08]). HHILL and HHILL
∗
are essentially equivalent, as shown in the following lemma (discovered
jointly with the authors of [DP08]), whose proof in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.1. HHILL,s′ (X) ≥ k ⇔ HHILL
∗
,s (X) ≥ k, for s′ ≈ s.
Unfortunately, only one direction of the equivalence holds for metric entropy (the proof is also
in Appendix A).
Lemma 2.2. HMetric,s′ (X) ≥ k ⇒ HMetric
∗
,s (X) ≥ k, for s′ ≈ s.
It is immediate that HHILL,s (X) ≥ k ⇒ HMetric,s (X) ≥ k and HHILL
∗
,s (X) ≥ k ⇒ HMetric
∗
,s (X) ≥ k.
For the opposite direction, the implication is known to hold only with a loss in quality and circuit
size, as proven by Barak, Shaltiel, and Wigderson [BSW03, Theorem 5.2]1.
Theorem 2.3. ([BSW03]) Let X be a discrete distribution over a finite set χ. For every , HILL >
0, ′ ≥ +HILL, k, and s, if HMetric∗,s (X) ≥ k then HHILL
∗
′,sHILL(X) ≥ k where sHILL = Ω(2HILLs/ log |χ|).
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Figure 1: Known state of equivalence for HILL and Metric Entropy. All of these equivalences carry
over to the conditional case.
2.3 Randomness Extractors
Originally defined for information-theoretic, rather than computational entropy, an extractor takes
a distribution X of min-entropy k, and with the help of a uniform string called the seed, “extracts”
the randomness contained in X and outputs a string of length m that is almost uniform even given
the seed.
Definition 4 ([NZ93]). Let χ be a finite set. A polynomial-time computable deterministic function
ext : χ× {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d is a strong (k, )-extractor if the last d outputs of bits of ext
1The theorem statement in [BSW03] is incorrect, because it confuses Metric and Metric∗ entropies. However, the
proofs seems correct with respect to Metric∗. We generalize the theorem slightly to allow for distributions over a
generic set χ rather than just {0, 1}n. Reingold et. al. [RTTV08, Theorem 1.3] contains a similar conversion but it
is tightly coupled with their proof.
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are equal to the last d input bits (these bits are called seed), and δ(ext(X,Ud), Um × Ud) ≤  for
every distribution X on χ with H∞(X) ≥ k. The number of extracted bits is m, and the entropy
loss is k −m.
It turns out that extractors can be applied to distributions with computational entropy to
obtain pseudorandom, rather than random, outputs: that is, outputs that are computationally
indistinguishable from, rather than statistically close to, uniformly random strings. This fact is
well-known for HILL entropy. However, we have not seen it proven for Metric entropy and, although
the proof is quite straightforward, we provide it here for completeness. (Since HILL entropy implies
Metric entropy, this proof also works for HILL entropy.)
Theorem 2.4. Let ext : χ × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d be a (k, ext)-extractor, computable by
circuits of size sext. Let X be a distribution over χ with Hmetricmetric,s(X) ≥ k. Then ∀D ∈ Ds′, where
s′ ≈ smetric − sext,
δD(ext(X,Ud), Um × Ud) ≤ ext + metric .
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose not, that is, ∃D ∈ Ds′ such that
δD(ext(X,Ud), Um × Ud)) > ext + metric.
We use D to construct a distinguisher D′ to distinguish X from all distributions Y where H∞(Y ) ≥
k, violating the metric-entropy of X. We define D′ as follows: upon receiving input α ∈ χ, D′
samples seed ← Ud, runs β ← ext(α, seed) and then runs D(β, seed) on the result. Note that
D′ ∈ Ds where s ≈ s′ + sext = smetric. Thus we have the following ∀Y, where H∞(Y ) ≥ k:
δD
′
(X,Y ) = δD(ext(X,Ud), ext(Y, Ud))
≥ δD(ext(X,Ud), Um × Ud)− δD((ext(Y, Ud), Um × Ud)
> ext + metric − ext = metric
Thus D′ is able to distinguish X from all Y with sufficient min-entropy. This is a contradiction.
Unfortunately, the theorem does not extend to Metric∗ entropy, because the distinguisher D′
we construct in this proof is randomized. The only way to extract from Metric∗ entropy that we
know of is to convert Metric∗ entropy to HILL∗ entropy using Theorem 2.3 (which incurs some
loss) and then use Theorem 2.4.
2.4 Conditional Entropy and Extraction
Conditional entropy measures the entropy that remains in a distribution after some information
about the distribution is leaked. There are many different possible definitions. We follow the
definition of “average min-entropy” [DORS08, Section 2.4]; the reasons for that particular choice
of definition are detailed there. Because min-entropy is the negative logarithm of the highest
probability, average min-entropy is defined the negative logarithm of the average, over the condition,
of highest probabilities.
Definition 5 ([DORS08]). Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables. The average min-entropy
of X conditioned on Y is defined as
H˜∞(X|Y ) def= − log[E
Y
(2−H∞(X|Y ))] = − log
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]2−H∞(X|Y=y)
4
The definition of average min-entropy has been extended to the computational case by Hsiao,
Lu, Reyzin [HLR07].
Definition 6. ([HLR07]) Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables. X has conditional HILL entropy
at least k conditioned on Y , denoted HHILL,s (X|Y ) ≥ k if there exists a collection of distributions
Zy for each y ∈ Y , giving rise to a joint distribution (Z, Y ), such that H˜∞(Z|Y ) ≥ k and ∀D ∈
Ds, δD((X,Y ), (Z, Y )) ≤ .
Again, we can switch the quantifiers of Z and D to obtain the defintion of conditional metric
entropy.
Definition 7. Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables. X has conditional metric entropy at
least k conditioned on Y , denoted by HMetric,s (X|Y ) ≥ k, if ∀D ∈ Ds there exists a collection of
distributions Zy for each y ∈ Y , giving rise to a joint distribution (Z, Y ), such that H˜∞(Z|Y ) ≥ k
and δD((X,Y ), (Z, Y )) ≤ .
Conditional HILL∗ and conditional Metric∗ can be defined similarly, replacing D with D∗. The
same relations among the four notions of conditional entropy hold as in the unconditional case (see
Lemma B.1 for an example).
Similarly to information-theoretic average-case entropy [DORS08, Lemma 2.2a], conditional
Metric∗ entropy implies, with some confidence, a smaller amount of lower-quality Metric∗ entropy,
as shown in Appendix B.
Average-case extractors, defined in [DORS08, Section 2.5], are extractors extended to work with
average-case, rather than unconditional, min-entropy. It is also shown there that every extractor
can be converted to an average-case extractor with some loss, and that some extractors are already
average-case extractors without any loss.
Definition 8. Let χ1, χ2 be finite sets. An extractor ext is a (k, )-average-case extractor if for all
pairs of random variablesX,Y over χ1, χ2 such that H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ k, we have δ((ext(X,Ud), Y ), Um×
Ud × Y ) ≤ .
Similar to extractors in the case of unconditional entropy, average-case extractors can be used
on distributions that have Metric∗ (and therefore also on distributions that have HILL or HILL∗)
conditional entropy to produce psuedorandom, rather than random outputs. The proof is similar
to [HLR07, Lemma 5].
3 Main Results: Computational Entropy after Leakage
We first present our main results. Proofs are presented in Section 3.4. As a starting point, consider
Lemma 3 of [DP08], modified slightly to separate the quality of entropy parameter 1 from the
confidence parameter 2 (both are called  in [DP08]):
Lemma 3.1 ([DP08, Lemma 3]). Let prg : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ν and f : {0, 1}n :→ {0, 1}λ (where
1 ≤ λ < n < ν) be any functions. If prg is a (prg, s)-secure pseudorandom-generator, then for any
1, 2,∆ > 0 satisfying prg ≤ 12/2λ − 2−∆, we have with X ∼ Un,
Pr
y:=f(X)
[HMetric
∗
1,s′ (prg(X)|f(X) = y) ≥ ν −∆] ≥ 1− 2 (1)
where s′ ≈ s.
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Our results improve the parameters and simplify the exposition. Our main theorem, proven in
Section 3.4.2, is as follows:
Theorem 3.2. Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HMetric
∗
|Y |,s′ (X|Y ) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X)− log |Y |
where s′ ≈ s.
Intuitively, this theorem says that the quality and quantity of entropy reduce by the number of
leakage values. It seems unlikely that the bounds can be much improved. The loss in the amount
of entropy is necessary when, for example, X is the output of a pseudorandom generator and the
leakage consists of log |Y | bits of X. The loss in the quality of entropy seems necessary when the
leakage consists of log |Y | bits of the seed used to generate X. (However, we do not know how to
show that both losses are necessary simultaneously.)
The theorem holds even if the metric entropy in X is also conditional (see Theorem 3.6 for
the formal statement), and thus can be used in cases of repeated leakage as a chain rule. This
theorem is more general than Lemma 3.1, because it applies to any discrete random variables
with sufficient entropy, rather than just the output of a pseudorandom generator2. Because of the
average-case formulation, it is also simpler. In addition, the average-case formulation allows one
to apply average-case extractors (such as universal hash functions) without the additional loss of
2 (after the conversion to HILL entropy, see Corollary 3.7) and handles cases of repeated leakage
better (because one does not have to account for 2 multiple times).
Simplicity and generality aside, this result is quantitatively better. To make the quantitative
comparison, we present the following alternative formulation of our result, in the style of [DP08,
Lemma 3]:
Lemma 3.3. Let X,Y be discrete random variables with |Y | ≤ 2λ and HMetric∗ent,s (X) ≥ ν, then for
any 1, 2,∆ > 0 satisfying ent ≤ 12/2λ and 2−∆ ≤ 2/2λ,
Pr
y∈Y
[HMetric
∗
1,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ ν −∆)] ≥ 1− 2
where s′ ≈ s.
To compare the bounds, observe that we have removed 1 from 2−∆, because the constraint
prg ≤ 12/2λ − 2−∆ in particular implies that prg ≤ 12/2λ and 12/2λ ≥ 2−∆.
3.1 Structure of the Proof
We begin by presenting Theorem 1.3 of [RTTV08], restated in our language, which provides a
similar result for HILL entropy.
Lemma 3.4 ([RTTV08, Theorem 1.3]). Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HHILL′,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HHILL,s (X)− log 1/Py (2)
where Py = Pr[Y = y], ′ = Ω(/Py), and s′ = s/poly(Py/, log 1/Py)
2The output of a pseudorandom generator has full HILL entropy and thus full Metric∗ entropy.
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The works of [DP08][RTTV08] both utilize the proof technique presented in Figure 2(quality,
quantity parameters are removed for clarity). In our lemma, we focus on the second conversion
showing that
HMetric(X) ≥ ν ⇒ HMetric(X|Y = y) ≥ ν −∆.
The use of Metric∗ entropy still captures the interesting aspects of [DP08] and [RTTV08] and
HHILL(X|Y = y) ≥ ν −∆
HHILL(X) ≥ ν
HMetric(X) ≥ ν
HMetric(X|y = y) ≥ ν −∆
ff
Loss in
circuit size
-
Lossless
?
N
ovel
Figure 2: Structure of proof in [DP08], [RTTV08]
allows us to provide an tight reduction and will allow the proof of a “chain rule” (Theorem 3.6).
This is because the chain rule only uses the second step multiple times, converting back to HILL
entropy only once.
We now state the main technical lemma, a given leakage value decreases the Metric∗ entropy
quality and quantity proportionally to its probability:
Lemma 3.5. Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HMetric
∗
/Py ,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X)− log 1/Py (3)
where Py = Pr[Y = y] and s′ ≈ s.
The lemma is quite intuitive: the more surprising a leakage value is, the more it decreases the
entropy. Its proof proceeds by contradiction: assuming that a distinguisher D exists for X|Y = y,
we build a distinguisher D′ for X. The structure of the proof is similar to the structure of the proof
of [DP08], but the new D′ is more complicated, as is the analysis of its performance. Here is the
outline of the proof (see Section 3.4.1 for the details). Let ν = HMetric
∗
,s (X).
1. Suppose D distinguishes X|Y = y from any distribution Z of min-entropy ν −∆. Show that
either for all such Z, E[D(Z)] is lower than E[D(X|Y = y)], or for all such Z, E[D(Z)] is
higher than E[D(X|Y = y)]. Assume the former without loss of generality. This initial step
allows us to remove absolute values and to find a high-entropy distribution Z+ on which
E[D(Z)] is the highest.
2. Show that Z+ must be essentially flat, and let α be minz∈Z+ D(z).
3. Create a new distinguisher D′ that rescales the output of D by stretching the interval [α, 1]
to [0, 1]. In other words, if the output x of D is less than α, then D′ outputs 0; else it outputs
x−α
1−α . (In [DP08], D
′ chose a higher cut-off point and, instead of rescaling, simply output
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0 if x was less than the cut-off point and 1 otherwise. It thus lost in performance if that
particular cut-off point was not a good one. Rescaling allows us to avoid hitting a single bad
cut-off point; cutting off at α improves the performance of D′(X).)
4. Show an upper bound on E[D′(W )] for anyW of min-entropy ν, by using the fact that outside
of Z+, D′ outputs 0.
5. Show a lower bound on E[D′(X)], by first calculating E[D′(X|Y = y)].
6. Show a significant gap exists between these two values, regardless of α.
Theorem 3.2 follows in a straightforward way from Lemma 3.5 . In fact, the lemma allows us
to prove a stronger version—a chain rule.
Theorem 3.6. Let X,Y1, Y2 be discrete random variables. Then
HMetric
∗
|Y2|,s′ (X|Y1, Y2) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y1)− log |Y2|
where s′ ≈ s.
The proof of the theorem, presented in Section 3.4.2, first translates the conditional Metric∗
entropy of X|Y1 to Metric∗ entropy for each distribution X|Y1 = y1. We then apply Lemma 3.5
and obtain conditional Metric∗ entropy by averaging over all points in Y1, Y2. Note that Y1, Y2
do not need to be independent. (Indeed, this makes sense: if two leakage functions are correlated,
then they are providing the adversary with less information.)
This combined with Lemma B.1 allows us to state a HILL-entropy version, as well.
Corollary 3.7. Let X,Y1, Y2 be discrete random variables and let HILL > 0. Then
HHILL
∗
|Y2|+HILL,sHILL(X|Y1, Y2) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y1)− log |Y2|
where sHILL = Ω(
2HILLs
log |X|).
3.2 HILL⇒ HILL lemma
To facilitate comparison with [RTTV08] we present a “HILL-to-HILL” version of Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.8. Let X be a discrete random variable over χ and let Y be a discrete random variable.
Then,
HHILL′,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HHILL,s (X)− log 1/Py (4)
where Py = Pr[Y = y], ′ = /Py + HILL, and s′ = Ω(s2HILL/ log |χ|).
The lemma follows by application of Lemma 3.5 and [BSW03, Theorem 5.2]. By setting HILL =
Ω(/Py) one obtains the following result:
Lemma 3.9. Let X be a discrete random variable over χ and let Y be a discrete random variable.
Then,
HHILL′,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HHILL,s (X)− log 1/Py (5)
where Py = Pr[Y = y], ′ = Ω(/Py), and s′ = Ω(s(/Py)2/ log |χ|).
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Recall the result from [RTTV08]:
Lemma 3.4. Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HHILL′,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HHILL,s (X)− log 1/Py (6)
where Py = Pr[Y = y], ′ = Ω(/Py), and s′ = s/poly(Py/, log 1/Py)
Note all the parameters are the same, except the losses in circuit size. The exact comparison is
difficult because the polynomial in [RTTV08] is not specified, and log |χ| may be bigger or smaller
than log 1/Py. However, the current work has the added benefit of the chain rule (Theorem 3.6)
before the conversion back to HILL entropy. In the case of repeated leakage, the gain of only paying
the Metric to HILL conversion once should dominate the difference between the two results.
3.3 Improvement for randomized leakage
There are many meaningful situations where there is randomness inherent in Y that has nothing
to do with X. In this case we can prove a stronger result than in Theorem 3.2. The result is:
Theorem 3.10. Let X,Y be discrete random variables and let L = 2
−Hˆ∞(X|Y )
minx∈X Pr[X=x]
. Then HMetric
∗
L,s′ (X|Y ) ≥
HMetric
∗
,s (X)− logL where s′ ≈ s.
Notice that this result is the same as Theorem 3.2, except |Y | is replaced with L. For a uniform
X, this theorem provides an optimal bound:
H∞(X)− H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ HMetric∗,s (X)−HMetric
∗
(H∞(X)−H˜∞(X|Y )),s′(X|Y )
where s′ ≈ s. However, because of the minx∈X Pr[X = x] the result breaks down for repeated
leakage, as the leakage Y can make a particular event arbitrarily unlikely. The intuition behind the
theorem is the E[D′(X)] can be measured more carefully; the proof is in Section 3.4.3. Lemma 3.5
can also be improved for the case of randomized leakage: the improved version replaces Py with
Py/maxx Pr[Y = y|X = x].
3.4 Proofs
In this section we present a detailed exposition of our results. Let Py = Pr[Y = y] for the random
variable y ∈ Y , Y should be clear from context. Let 1B define the indicator random variable that
is 1 when B is true and 0 otherwise.
3.4.1 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Recall the main technical lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HMetric
∗
/Py ,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X)− log 1/Py (7)
where Py = Pr[Y = y] and s′ ≈ s.
9
Proof. Assume HMetric
∗
,s (X) ≥ ν. We denote ′ = /Py. Let χ be the outcome space of X. We
assume for contradiction that
HMetric
∗
/Py ,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ ν − log 1/Py
does not hold. By definition of metric entropy there exists distinguisher Dy ∈ D∗s such that ∀Z
with H∞(Z) ≥ ν − log 1/Py we have
|E[Dy(X)|Y = y]− E[Dy(Z)]| ≥ ′.
Let Z− and Z+ be distributions of min-entropy ν−log 1/Py minimizing E[Dy(Z−)] and maximizing
E[Dy(Z+)] respectively. Let β−
def
= E[Dy(Z−)], β+
def
= E[Dy(Z+)] and β
def
= E[Dy(X)|Y = y].
Claim 3.11. Either β− < β+ + ′ ≤ β or β ≤ β− − ′ < β+.
From Equation 8 and the fact that Z+, Z− have min-entropy at least ν − log 1/Py it suffices to
show that either β− ≤ β+ ≤ β or β ≤ β− ≤ β+. Suppose it does not hold. Then we can define a
distribution Z as a convex combination of Z+, Z− with H∞(Z) ≥ ν − log 1/Py and E[Dy(Z)] = β.
This is a contradiction of Equation 8.
For the rest of the proof we will assume that the first case β− < β+ + ′ ≤ β holds3. Let
α = minz∈Z+ Dy(z). We define a distinguisher D′y as follows
D′y(z) =
{
0 Dy(z) ≤ α
Dy(z)−α
1−α otherwise
(8)
Claim 3.12. For all z if Pr[Z+ = z] 6= 2−ν+log 1/Py , then Dy(z) ≤ α and therefore D′y(z) = 0.
Proof. It suffices to show there does not exist a z where Pr[Z+ = z] < 2−ν+log 1/Py and Dy(x) > α.
Suppose for contradiction that there exists an z where Pr[Z+ = z] < 2−ν+log 1/Py and Dy(z) > α.
Choose a w,Pr[Z+ = w] > 0 such that Dy(w) = α. Then define gap = min{2−ν+log 1/Py −Pr[Z+ =
z],Pr[Z+ = w]} > 0. Thus, we define a new distribution Z ′ identical to Z+ at all other points and
with
Pr[Z ′ = z] = Pr[Z+ = z] + gap, Pr[Z ′ = w] = Pr[Z+ = w]− gap
Note thatH(Z ′) ≥ ν−log 1/Py. Then we have E[Dy(Z ′)] > E[Dy(Z+)] which is a contradiction.
Claim 3.13. For all W over χ where H∞(W ) ≥ ν, E[D′y(W )] ≤ β
+−α
1−α 2
− log 1/Py .
Proof. One has
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈W
Pr[W = z]1Dy(z)≥α
Dy(z)− α
1− α
3The main differences are that we work with Z−, define α = maxz∈Z− Dy(z), and define D
′
y(z) to be 0 when
Dy(z) > α and to be
“
1− Dy(z)
α
”
otherwise. We provide a full proof in Appendix D.
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By Claim 3.12 we can write the sum as
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈Z+
Pr[W = z]
Dy(z)− α
1− α
We also know that Pr[W = z] ≤ 2−ν and that for all terms that contribute to the sum Pr[Z+ =
w] = 2−ν+log 1/Py . Thus one has
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈Z+
Pr[W = z]
Dy(z)− α
1− α
≤
∑
z∈Z+
1
2ν
Dy(z)− α
1− α
=
∑
z∈Z+
1
2ν−log 1/Py
2− log 1/Py
Dy(z)− α
1− α
=
∑
z∈Z+
Pr[Z+ = z]Py
Dy(z)− α
1− α
=
E[Dy(Z+)]− α
1− α Py
=
β+ − α
1− α Py
This completes the claim.
Claim 3.14. E[D′y(X)] ≥ β−α1−αPy
Proof. One computes
E[D′y(X)] = E[D′y(X)|Y = y] Pr[Y = y] + E[D′y(X)|Y 6= y] Pr[Y 6= y]
≥ E[D′y(X)|Y = y] Pr[Y = y]
=
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x|Y = y]Dy(x)− α
1− α Py1Dy(x))≥α
≥
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x|Y = y]Dy(x)− α
1− α Py
≥ E[Dy(X|Y = y)]− α
1− α Py
≥ β − α
1− αPy
By combining Claims 3.13 and 3.14 we have that for all W over χ with H∞(W ) ≥ ν we have
that
E[D′y(X)]− E[D′y(W )] ≥
β − α
1− αPy −
β+ − α
1− α Py =
β − β+
1− α Py (9)
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Now recall that by Claim 3.11 that β+ + ′ < β. One has:
E[D′y(X)]− E[D′y(W )] ≥
β − β+
1− α Py
≥ (β − β+)Py > ′Py = 
Thus, we have successfully distinguished the distributionX from all distributionsW of sufficient
min-entropy. This is a contradiction.
3.4.2 Proof of Theorems 3.6 and 3.2
We recall and prove Theorem 3.6 and note that Theorem 3.2 is a special case.
Theorem 3.6. Let X,Y1, Y2 be discrete random variables. Then HMetric
∗
|Y2|,s′ (X|Y1, Y2) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y1)−
log |Y2| where s′ ≈ s.
Proof. Assume HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y1) ≥ ν. By the definition of conditional metric entropy we know that
there exists two functions ν(·) representing the metric entropy for each y1 and (·) representing the
quality of distinguishing for each y1. That is:
, ν : Y1 → R+ ∪ {0}
subject to the following constraints where s′ ≈ s:
HMetric
∗
(y1),s′ (X|Y1 = y1) ≥ ν(y1)∑
y1∈Y1
Pr[Y1 = y1](y1) < 
HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y1) = − log
(
Ey1∈Y1 [2−ν(y1)]
)
≥ ν
Fix y1 ∈ Y1, y2 ∈ Y2. Let (y1, y2) = (y1)Pr[Y2=y2|Y1=y1] and let ∆ = − log Pr[Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1] then
by Lemma 3.5 we know that HMetric
∗
(y1,y2),s′(X|Y1 = y1 ∧ Y2 = y2) ≥ ν(y1) − ∆ where s′ ≈ s. Fix
D ∈ D∗s′ . Denote by Zy1,y2 a distribution with H∞(Zy1,y2) ≥ ν(y1)−∆ and |E[D(X|Y1 = y1, Y2 =
y2, y1, y2)]−E[D(Zy1,y2 , y1, y2)]| < (y1, y2). These Zy1,y2 give rise to a distribution Z. We calculate
the performance of D on all of X,Z
|E[D(X,Y1, Y2)]− E[D(Z, Y1, Y2)]|
=
∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
Pr[Y1 = y1 ∧ Y2 = y2]|E[D((X|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2), y1, y2)]− E[D(Zy1,y2 , y1, y2)]|
<
∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
Pr[Y1 = y1] Pr[Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1](y1, y2)
=
∑
y1∈Y1
Pr[Y1 = y1]
∑
y2∈Y2
(y1)
=|Y2|
∑
y1∈Y1
Pr[Y1 = y1](y1) < |Y2|
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It now suffices to show that Z has sufficient average min-entropy, we calculate:
H˜∞(Z|Y1, Y2) = − log
∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
Pr[Y1 = y1 ∧ Y2 = y2]2−H∞(Zy1,y2 )

≥ − log
∑
y1∈Y1
Py1
∑
y2∈Y2
Pr[Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1]2−(ν(y1)−∆)

= − log
∑
y1∈Y1
Py1
∑
y2∈Y2
Pr[Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1] 2
−(ν(y1))
Pr[Y2 = y2|Y1 = y1]

= − log |Y2| − log
∑
y1∈Y1
Py12
−ν(y1)

≥ ν − log |Y2|
This completes the proof.
3.4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.10
The largest change is to the Claim 3.14, which gets replaced with the following.
Claim 3.15. E[D′y(X)] ≥ β−α1−α
minx′∈X Pr[X=x′]
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
Proof. One computes
E[D′y(X)] =
∑
x
Pr[X = x]D′y(x)
=
∑
x
Pr[X = x]D′y(x)
maxx′∈X Pr[X = x′|Y = y]
maxx′∈X Pr[X = x′|Y = y]
=
1
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
∑
x
Pr[X = x]D′y(x) max
x′∈X
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = y]
≥ 1
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
∑
x
min
x′∈X
Pr[X = x′]D′y(x) max
x′∈X
Pr[X = x|Y = y]
≥ 1
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
∑
x
min
x′∈X
Pr[X = x′]D′y(x) Pr[X = x|Y = y]
≥ minx′∈X Pr[X = x
′]
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
∑
x
D′y(x) Pr[X = x|Y = y]
=
minx′∈X Pr[X = x′]
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
β − α
1− α
This allows us to state a modified version of Lemma 3.5.
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Lemma 3.16. Let X,Y be discrete random variables. Then
HMetric
∗
′,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ HMetric
∗
,s (X)− (H0(X)−H∞(X|Y = y)) (10)
where ′ = 2
−H∞(X|Y=y)
2−H0(X)  and s
′ ≈ s.
This allows us to state our modified theorem:
Theorem 3.10. Let X,Y be discrete random variables and let L = 2
−Hˆ∞(X|Y )
minx∈X Pr[X=x]
. Then HMetric
∗
L,s′ (X|Y ) ≥
HMetric
∗
,s (X)− logL where s′ ≈ s.
Proof. AssumeHMetric
∗
,s (X) ≥ ν. Then by Lemma 3.16 for each y ∈ Y we know thatHMetric
∗
Ly ,s′ (X|Y =
y) ≥ ν − logLy where s′ ≈ s and Ly = 2−H∞(X|Y=y)minx∈X Pr[X=x] . Fix D ∈ D∗s′ . Denote by Zy a distribution
with H∞(Zy) ≥ ν − logLy and |E[D(X|Y = y)] − E[D(Zy)]| < Ly. These Zy give rise to a
distribution Z. We calculate the performance of D on all of X,Z
|E[D(X)]− E[D(Z)]| =
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]|E[D((X|Y = y)]− E[D(Zy)]|
<
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]Ly
=

minx∈X Pr[X = x]
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]2−H∞(X|Y=y)
=
2−Hˆ∞(X|Y )
minx∈X Pr[X = x]
= L
It now suffices to show that Z has sufficient average min-entropy, we calculate:
H˜∞(Z|Y ) = − log
∑
y∈Y
Pr[Y = y]2−H∞(Zy)

≥ − log
∑
y∈Y
Py2−(ν−logLy)

= − log
∑
y∈Y
Py2−νLy

= − log
∑
y∈Y
Py2−ν
2−H∞(X|Y=y)
minx∈X Pr[X = x]

= ν + log
(
min
x∈X
Pr[X = x]
)
− log
∑
y∈Y
Py2−H∞(X|Y=y)

= ν + log
(
min
x∈X
Pr[X = x]
)
+ Hˆ∞(X|Y ))
This completes the proof.
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A HILL ⇔ HILL∗ and Metric⇒ Metric∗
Lemma 2.1. HHILL,s′ (X) ≥ k ⇔ HHILL
∗
,s (X) ≥ k, for s′ ≈ s.
Proof. First, suppose HHILL
∗
,s (X) < k—that is, ∀Y such that H∞(Y ) ≥ k, ∃D ∈ D∗s such that
|E[D(X)] − E[D(Y )]| > . Fix Y with H∞(Y ) ≥ k. Choose D ∈ D∗s such that |E[D(X)] −
E[D(Y )]| > . Then we construct a distinguisher D′(·) as follows:
D′(x) =
{
0 with probability 1−D(x)
1 with probability D(x)
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It is clear that D′ ∈ Ds′ for s′ close to s (D′ can be implemented by choosing a random number
r ∈ [0, 1) of the same precision as the output of D and performing a single comparison: output 1 if
r < D(x) and 0 otherwise). Note also that for all x, E[D′(x)] = D(x), and therefore ∀X,E[D′(X)] =
E[D(X)], and thus
|E[D′(X)]− E[D′(Y )]| = |E[D(X)]− E[D(Y )]| >  ,
which implies that HHILL,s′ (X) < k.
Now supposeHHILL,s′ (X) < k—that is, ∀Y such thatH∞(Y ) ≥ k,∃D ∈ Ds such that |E[D(X;U)]−
E[D(Y ;U)]| > . Here U is the distribution of the randomness needed by the circuit D. Fix Y
with H∞(Y ) ≥ k. Choose D ∈ Ds such that |E[D(X;U)]− E[D(Y ;U)]| > . Thus we have that
 < | E
u∈U
[D(X;u)]− E
u∈U
E[D(Y ;u)]|
≤
∑
u∈U
1
|U | |E[D(X;u)]− E[D(Y ;u)]|
Thus, there exists a u ∈ U such that |E[D(X;u)]− E[D(X;u)]| > . We hardwire that u in place
of the random gates of D to define D′(·) which on input x outputs the result of D(x;u). Clearly,
D ∈ D∗s and |E[D′(X)]−E[D′(Y )]| = |E[D(X;u)]−E[D(X;u)]| > . This completes the proof.
Lemma 2.2. HMetric,s′ (X) ≥ k ⇒ HMetric
∗
,s (X) ≥ k, for s′ ≈ s.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists D ∈ D∗s such that ∀Y , ∀Y with H∞(Y ) ≥ k, we have
|E[D(X)]− E[D(Y )]| > . Build D′ ∈ Ds′ out of D the same way as in the corresponding case of
Lemma 2.1.
B Conditional Metric∗ implies conditional HILL∗
To demonstrate that the equivalences of Figure 2.2 hold in the conditional case we present the most
complicated case. That is, we extend the proof of [BSW03] of equivalence of HILL∗ and Metric∗
to the conditional case. The other transformations are done similarly by breaking the conditional
distribution into the component distributions X|Y = y performing the transformation there and
translating back.
Lemma B.1. Let X,Y be distributions with discrete outcome spaces with X taking values over
χ. Then ∀, HILL > 0, k if HMetric∗,s (X|Y ) ≥ k then HHILL
∗
+HILL,sHILL
(X|Y ) ≥ k where sHILL ≈
2HILLs/ log |χ|.
Proof. By the definition of average min-entropy we know that there exists two functions, ν(·), (·)
that represent the quantity of each conditional entropy (H(X|Y = y)) and the quality of each
conditional entropy respectively. More formally there exists functions:
, ν : Y → R+ ∪ {0}
subject to the following constraints where s′ ≈ s:
HMetric
∗
(y),s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ ν(y)∑
y∈Y
Py(y) < 
HMetric
∗
,s (X|Y ) = − log
(
Ey∈Y [2−ν(y)]
)
≥ k
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We make no claims about any of the individual values only their averaged values. Then by Theorem
2.3 we know that for each y
HHILL
∗
(y)+HILL,sHILL
(X|Y = y) ≥ ν(y)
where sHILL ≈ 2HILLs/ log |χ|. Thus we know there exists a collection of distributions Zy with
H∞(Zy) ≥ ν(y) giving rise to the distribution Z. Let D ∈ D∗sHILL , we calculate the performance
of D on (Z, Y ):
|E[D(X,Y )− E[D(Z, Y )]| =
∑
y∈Y
Py|E[D(X, y)]− E[D(Z, y)]|
<
∑
y∈Y
Py ((y) + HILL)
< +
∑
y∈Y
PyHILL
= + HILL ≤ ′
Then note that
H˜∞(Z|Y ) ≥ − log
(
Ey∈Y [2−H∞(Z|Y=y)]
)
≥ − log
(
Ey∈Y [2ν(y)]
)
≥ k
That is H˜∞(Z|Y ) ≥ k. Thus we know that HHILL∗+HILL,sHILL(X|Y ) ≥ k.
C Proof of Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3. Let X,Y be discrete random variables with |Y | ≤ 2λ and HMetric∗ent,s (X) ≥ ν, then for
any 1, 2,∆ > 0 satisfying ent ≤ 12/2λ and 2−∆ ≤ 2/2λ,
Pr
y∈Y
[HMetric
∗
1,s′ (X|Y = y) ≥ ν −∆)] ≤ 1− 2
where s′ ≈ s.
Proof. The proof is similar to the corresponding portion of the proof of [DP08, Lemma 3]. We
denote Py = Pr[Y = y]. Assume for contradiction that the theorem does not hold. By the
definition of metric entropy, there exists a set
S where Pr[y ∈ S] > 2
and ∀y ∈ S,∃Dy ∈ D∗s such that for all random variables Z with H∞(Z) ≥ m−∆ we have
|E[Dy(Z)]− E[Dy(X|Y = y]| ≥ 1. (11)
Then consider a y ∈ S such that
Py > 2−λ2.
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Such a y exists, because otherwise Pr[y ∈ S] ≤ |Y |2−λ2 = 2. Then by Lemma 3.5 we know that
HMetric
∗
ent/Py ,s′(X|Y = y) ≥ ν − log 1/Py, and therefore
HMetric
∗
2λent/2,s′(X|Y = y) > ν − log 2λ/2 ,
where s′ ≈ s. Thus, there exists a Z with H∞(Z) ≥ ν −∆ ≥ ν − log 2/2λ for which
|E[Dy(Z)]− E[Dy(X|y = y)] < 2λent/2 ≤ 1 .
This contradicts equation 11.
D Lemma 3.5 using other side of Claim 3.11
In this section we proceed to show that Lemma 3.5 is valid if the assumption is made that β ≤
β− −  < β+ in Claim 3.11. The other choice is made in text of the paper. We continue the proof
directly from the definition of D′y.
Proof. Assume that β ≤ β− −  < β+. Let α = maxz∈Z− Dy(z). We define a distinguisher D′y as
follows
D′y(z) =
{
0 Dy(z) ≥ α
1− Dy(z)α otherwise
(12)
Claim D.1. For all z if Pr[Z− = z] 6= 2−ν+log 1/Py , then Dy(z) ≥ α and therefore D′y(z) = 0.
Proof. It suffices to show there does not exist a z where Pr[Z− = z] < 2−ν+log 1/Py and Dy(x) < α.
Suppose for contradiction that there exists an z where Pr[Z− = z] < 2−ν+log 1/Py and Dy(z) < α.
Choose a w,Pr[Z− = w] > 0 such that Dy(w) = α. Then define gap = min{2−ν+log 1/Py −Pr[Z− =
z],Pr[Z− = w]} > 0. Thus, we define a new distribution Z ′ identical to Z− at all other points and
with
Pr[Z ′ = z] = Pr[Z− = z] + gap
Pr[Z ′ = w] = Pr[Z− = w]− gap
Note that H(Z ′) ≥ ν − log 1/Py. Then we have E[Dy(Z ′)] < E[Dy(Z−)] which is a contradiction.
Claim D.2. For all W over χ where H∞(W ) ≥ ν, E[D′y(W )] ≤
(
1− β−α
)
Py.
Proof. One has
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈W
Pr[W = z]1Dy(z)≤α
(
1− z
α
)
By Claim D.1 we can write the sum as
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈Z−
Pr[W = z]
(
1− z
α
)
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We also know that Pr[W = z] ≤ 2−ν and that for all terms that contribute to the sum Pr[Z− =
w] = 2−ν+log 1/Py . Thus one has
E[D′y(W )] =
∑
z∈Z+
Pr[W = z]
(
1− z
α
)
≤
∑
z∈Z+
1
2ν
(
1− z
α
)
=
∑
z∈Z+
1
2ν−log 1/Py
2− log 1/Py
(
1− z
α
)
=
∑
z∈Z+
Pr[Z+ = z]Py
(
1− z
α
)
=
(
1− E[Dy(Z
−)]
α
)
Py =
(
1− β
−
α
)
Py
This completes the claim.
Claim D.3. E[D′y(X)] ≥
(
1− βα
)
Py
Proof. One computes
E[D′y(X)] = E[D
′
y(X)|Y = y] Pr[Y = y] + E[D′y(X)|Y 6= y] Pr[Y 6= y]
≥ E[D′y(X)|Y = y] Pr[Y = y]
=
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x|Y = y]
(
1− Dy(x)
α
)
Py1Dy(x))≤α
≥
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x|Y = y]
(
1− Dy(x)
α
)
Py
≥
(
1− E[Dy(X|Y = y)]
α
)
Py
≥
(
1− β
α
)
Py
By combining Claims D.2 and D.3 we have that for all W over χ with H∞(W ) ≥ ν we have
that
E[D′y(X)|Y = y]− E[D′y(W )] ≥
(
1− β
α
)
Py −
(
1− β
−
α
)
Py =
β− − β
α
Py (13)
Now recall that by Claim 3.11 that β− − ′ > β. One has:
E[D′y(X)]− E[D′y(W )] ≥
β− − β
α
Py
= (β− − β)Py > ′Py = 
Thus, we have successfully distinguished the distributionX from all distributionsW of sufficient
min-entropy. This is a contradiction.
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